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Abstract
The fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory representation is an issue of paramount forensic concern. Psychological science has been unable to offer more than vague generalities concerning the relation of retention interval to memory trace strength for the once-seen face. A
meta-analysis of 53 facial memory studies produced a highly reliable association (r = .18, d = 0.37) between longer retention intervals and
positive forgetting of once-seen faces, an effect equally strong for both face recognition and eyewitness identification studies. W. A. Wickelgren’s (1974, 1975, 1977) theory of recognition memory provided statistically satisfactory fits to 11 different empirical forgetting functions. Applied to the results of field studies of eyewitness memory, the theory yields predictions relevant to fact finders’ evaluations of
eyewitness credibility. A plausible upper limit for witness initial memory strength corresponds to a probability of .67 of being correct on a
fair six-person lineup. Furthermore, not only can the percentage of remaining memory strength be determined for any retention interval,
but this strength estimate can be translated into an estimated probability of being correct on a fair lineup of a specified size.
Keywords: eyewitness memory strength, forgetting of faces, retention interval, single-trace fragility theory

Unless the state possesses incriminating physical evidence,
eyewitness identification testimony is crucial whenever the
prosecution attempts to prove that the defendant and the perpetrator are one and the same. The reliability of an identification is affected by two classes of variables, system variables
and estimator variables (Wells, 1978). System variables are
those under the control of the criminal justice system, instructions given to eyewitnesses before they consider a lineup or
photospread or the method by which members of the lineup
other than the suspect are chosen, for instance. Estimator variables are those beyond the control of the criminal justice system and whose effects can only be estimated. These factors include, among many other estimator variables, the duration of
the eyewitness’s exposure to the perpetrator, lighting conditions at the crime scene, and retention interval, the length of
the interval between observation of the suspect and test of the
eyewitness’s memory.
Given the controllability of system variables, a considerable amount of research has been focused on them, given the
greater promise that such research would lead to increases in
the reliability of eyewitness memory testing procedures. Indeed, sufficient research progress on system variables had accumulated in the last 2 decades of the 20th century that the
U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines for the collection of eyewitness evidence based on these findings (Techni-

cal Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Police in a
number of jurisdictions around the United States have already
adopted these guidelines as standard practice.
Progress in producing forensically useful empirical generalizations has not been nearly as great in the case of estimator
variables. Nevertheless, research on these variables may have
the potential to produce not only greater understanding of situations in which eyewitnesses may experience perceptual or
memorial problems but also to yield empirical generalizations
that may assist the trier of fact (judge or juror) when he or she
must assess the fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory representation (cf. Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).
In making this assessment, the key estimator variables are
initial memory strength for the perpetrator’s face and length
of the retention interval. Many other estimator variables have
their effect only as they affect initial memory strength. These
variables include duration of exposure to the perpetrator, illumination conditions, presence or absence of other foci of attention (e.g., a weapon), eyewitness stress level, and whether
the perpetrator is of a different race, among others. To make
a proper assessment, the trier of fact would not only need to
have an estimate of the witness’s initial memory strength for
the perpetrator and to know the length of the retention interval but also to understand the nature of the forgetting function for the human face. The forgetting function, of course, is
139
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the curve that specifies the strength of the memory representation over the retention interval. That is, the forgetting function specifies how rapidly memory strength, plotted on the ordinate of the graph, decreases as a function of time, plotted on
the abscissa. Knowing the rate of memory strength loss and
retention interval length allows one to specify the proportion
of original memory strength remaining. To specify in absolute
terms how much memory strength remains, one must know
the initial memory strength, the “starting point” on the ordinate of the forgetting function.
Typically, the length of the retention interval for an eyewitness can easily be established to a reasonable degree of precision from information provided in police reports. Until now,
however, psychological science has not had a means to provide at least a ballpark estimate of initial memory strength for
a witness. Furthermore, cognitive psychologists have not established whether the forgetting curve for the human face is
even of the same form as Ebbinghaus (1913) had determined.
For that matter, it has not always been abundantly clear
whether there even is a statistically reliable association between retention interval length and facial recognition memory
(Deffenbacher, 1986). For example, in the period between 1970
(approximately the beginning of modern research on eyewitness testimony) and 1985, studies testing the effect of retention
interval length on memory for the human face included a substantial minority reporting a null effect. An initial meta-analysis of this literature by Deffenbacher (1986) included 15 studies
reporting a null effect out of a total of 33 studies, even though
overall he found a highly reliable effect (p < .0001) of memory
test delay on face recognition memory: The average z was 1.46,
yielding a meta-analytic Z of 8.38 and an equivalent correlation of .25 (as retention interval or delay increased, forgetting
increased). Including retention interval as part of a much more
comprehensive meta-analysis than Deffenbacher’s, Shapiro
and Penrod (1986) also documented statistically reliable effects
of retention interval length on face recognition memory.
With results of these previous meta-analyses in hand,
an immediate attempt to describe the forgetting function
for once-seen faces might seem in order. However, there are
good reasons to conduct a more up-to-date meta-analysis of
face memory studies before searching for a suitable theoretical forgetting function. In the more than 2 decades since 1986,
the published body of research findings concerning the effect
of delay has increased by more than 60%. The number of null
or negative (“negative” forgetting or reminiscence) results has
also continued to increase.
A further concern is the proportion of studies that have
been conducted in the context of the eyewitness identification
paradigm rather than with the standard face recognition task
in the tradition of cognitive psychology. The eyewitness identification paradigm usually exposes witnesses to a single target
face (perpetrator) in a scripted scenario. Memory for this face is
tested by embedding it in a 5- to 9-person live or photo lineup
(target present) or by substituting someone else who is a match
to the perpetrator’s description (target absent). Witnesses are
asked to identify the perpetrator or to indicate that he or she is
not present. The recognition memory task, on the other hand,
exposes observers to a relatively large number of target faces.
A recognition memory test typically includes the target set plus
an equal number of unfamiliar distracter faces. Observers are
exposed to faces serially and are to respond “yes” or “no” as to
whether a given face has been seen previously. It turns out that
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the proportion of eyewitness identification studies has more
than doubled, increasing from 27% of published studies concerned with the effect of delayed memory test in Deffenbacher’s (1986) meta-analysis to 57% at present.
As a result, not only has there been a considerable increase
in the proportion of studies with greater forensic applicability,
but it is entirely possible that the effect size for retention interval could be different for eyewitness identification studies than
for face recognition studies. Consider one possibility. Results of
face recognition memory studies have typically been assumed
to represent high estimates of the amount of facial memory obtaining in real-world eyewitness identification settings. If eyewitness identification studies did indeed produce lower estimates of initial memory strength than did face recognition
memory studies, then there would be less room for the decline
of any forgetting function to occur. Thus, retention interval effects might be less for studies in the eyewitness identification
paradigm because of the greater probability of a restriction of
range in possible loss of memory strength, as compared with
face recognition studies. On the other hand, the direction of a
difference in the effect size for retention interval could well be
in the opposite direction. A number of published meta-analyses of the effects of other independent variables have yielded
generally larger effects on memory for eyewitness identification studies then for laboratory face recognition studies. For instance, Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004)
found a considerably larger negative effect of heightened stress
on memory for witnesses in studies conducted in the more forensically relevant eyewitness identification tradition than for
witnesses in face recognition studies.
For all these reasons, before attempting a theoretical description of the forgetting function for face memory, we
deemed it advisable to conduct an up-to-date meta-analysis of
the effects of retention interval on the strength of a witness’s
memory representation for the once-seen face. We next present the methodology followed and the results obtained from
this meta-analysis.
Meta-Analysis of Retention Interval Effects
Method
Sample characteristics. Clark (2005), Deffenbacher et al.
(2004), and Reisberg and Heuer (2007) have all agreed that the
legal standards for proffered scientific testimony established
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) have strengthened the legal system’s preference for meta-analytic conclusions based on a body of well-conceived, well-executed, and
easily retrievable studies. Hence, we made the decision to include only published studies in our sample. A thorough search
of relevant citation retrieval systems was made. These systems
included PsycINFO, Medline, and Social SciSearch (the Social Science Citation Index). We also examined the citations in
published research and in social science convention proceedings. The present study sample consists of 39 published articles, books, and book chapters. These sources, listed in Table
1, generated 53 independent tests (N = 5,405) of the hypothesis that longer retention intervals have a negative effect on
memory strength for the once-seen face. Individual sample
sizes ranged considerably, from a low of 8 to a high of 590 (M
= 101.98). Retention intervals associated with these studies
ranged from 1 s to 350 days.
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Table 1. Effect Sizes for Proportion Correct Recognition Memory or Identification Accuracy
Study
Scapinello & Yarmey (1970)
Smith & Nielsen (1970)
Wallace et al. (1970)
Children
Adults
Goldstein & Chance (1971)
Shepherd & Ellis (1973)
Laughery et al. (1974)
Chance et al. (1975)
Egan et al. (1977)
Davies et al. (1978)
Walker-Smith (1978)
Yarmey (1979)
Ellis et al. (1980)
Courtois & Mueller (1981)
Deffenbacher et al. (1981): Control: 2 min/2 wk
Krouse (1981)
Mauldin & Laughery (1981)
Barkowitz and Brigham (1982)
Brigham et al. (1982)
Shepherd et al. (1982)
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Krafka & Penrod (1985)
TP/no context
TP/context
TA/no context
TA/context
Cutler et al. (1986): Experiment 2
Chance & Goldstein (1987)
Cutler et al. (1987a)
Cutler et al. (1987b)
Peters (1988)
Read et al. (1989)
Early rehearsal
Late rehearsal
Ellis & Flin (1990)
Podd (1990)
Read et al. (1990)
Goodman et al. (1991)
Peters (1991)
Experiment 1
Experiment 3
Shepherd et al. (1991)
Wixted & Ebbesen (1991): Experiment 2
Yarmey et al. (1996)
TP:5 min/24 hr
TA: 5 min/24 hr
Sh/TP: 5 min/24 hr
Sh/TA: 5 min/24 hr
Peters (1997): Experiment 2
MacLin et al. (2001)
Memon et al. (2003)
Older adults: TP
Younger adults: TP
Older adults: TA
Younger adults: TA
Yarmey (2004)
Brewer et al. (2006)
TP
TA

n

RI

z

r

40
144

20 min
10 s

0.00
3.30

.00
.28

200
200
52
36
292
144
86
40
8
84
48
128
22
76
100
237
88

5 min
5 min
2 days
35 days
1 week
2 days
54 days
19 days
19 s 2.58
30 days
1 week
28 days
2 weeks
2.5 days
47.5 hr
1 week
22 hr

0.00
0.00
0.00
1.92
0.00
0.00
1.65
1.96
.91
2.32
2.58
2.76
1.96
2.58
0.00
2.58
5.65

.00
.00
.00
.32
.00
.00
.18
.31

40
104

343 days
90 days

3.58
–0.72

.57
–.07

24
20
21
20
287
59
165
290
212

22 hr
22 hr
22 hr
22 hr
23 days
5 days
1 week
12 days
6 days

–0.22
0.45
2.16
1.41
2.75
0.00
–1.60
–0.47
0.00

–.04
.10
.47
.32
.16
.00
–.12
–.03
.00

68
68
153
90
90
48

1 week
2.63
1 week
–1.30
1 week
1.96
2 weeks 		
100 min
0.00
4.5 days
1.04

71
64
96
195

26 days
13 days
1 month
2 weeks

0.00
0.00
1.96
2.81

.00
.00
.20
.20

69
76
69
70
96
64

24 hr
24 hr
24 hr
24 hr
6 months
30 min

1.45
0.82
1.29
3.05
3.00
1.34

.17
.09
.16
.36
.31
.17

.25
.37
.24
.42
.30
.00
.17
.60

.32
–.16
.16
1.75 .18
.00
.15

45
42
42
42
590

1 week
1 week
1 week
1 week
4 hr

1.86
0.40
3.75
–0.97
0.00

.28
.06
.58
–.15
.00

37
66

30 min
30 min

0.00
0.00

.00
.00

RI = length of delay between shortest and longest retention intervals. TP = target present lineup; TA = target absent lineup; Sh = showup.
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Statistical procedures. As we always compared the longest
and shortest retention intervals in each study to determine
effect size, we selected z scores for a difference between proportions as the primary dependent measure. For the studies
in our sample, a z score for a difference between proportions
was occasionally reported or, more often, could be calculated
post hoc. In instances in which a test of the hypothesis was
reported as not statistically significant, but no statistics were
cited, we followed the conservative procedure of entering a z
of zero (Rosenthal, 1995). Otherwise, we entered a z score associated with the p value of the effect size estimate, 1.65 for p =
.05, one-tailed, for instance.
To test the statistical reliability of any estimate of typical
effect size, we calculated a one-sample t test and an associated 95% confidence interval (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2002).
Given that r and d are more frequently encountered measures of effect size, and in the case of r, may be a more generally useful measure, we have reported mean effect sizes in
terms of r and d as well. In the case of r, we first converted
the z-score measures of effect size for each study to r by dividing z by the square root of n, a conversion formula recommended by Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2002). Each of these
biserial correlation coefficients between retention interval
(short or long) and memory accuracy was then normalized
by conversion to the equivalent Fisher’s z′ score before averaging. Values of Cohen’s d equivalent to the mean effect size
expressed in terms of r were obtained by use of the expression d = 2 r (1 − r 2)−1/2.
Results and Discussion
For each study, we subtracted the proportion correct associated with the longer retention interval from the proportion
correct associated with the shorter retention interval. Thus, a
positive result represented positive forgetting, a loss of memory. A negative result represented negative forgetting, or reminiscence. When we report effect size in terms of r, then a positive r means that longer retention intervals were associated
with more forgetting.
The unweighted mean r was .18, significantly different
from zero, t(52) = 4.78, p < .005, with the 95% confidence interval (CI) extending from .10 to .26. The mean effect size for r
in this instance is equivalent to d = 0.37, a small to medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). We should note that when all possible
pairwise comparisons of retention intervals in studies that had
more than two retention intervals were treated as independent
effect sizes, the sample size increased from 53 to 78, and the
mean effect size was .17 (d = 0.34), remarkably close to the results we obtained when only the longest and shortest retention
intervals were compared.
We next applied a test of homogeneity of variances across
the sample of weighted effect sizes to determine whether the
degree of variability exceeded that expected on the basis of
sampling error alone. A chi-square value of 23.19 (df = 52, p
> .05) indicated that the degree of variability did not exceed
that expected on the basis of sampling error. Strictly speaking,
then, no moderator analyses were required. However, given
our prediction that studies conducted in the context of the eyewitness identification paradigm might well show more or even
less of an effect of retention interval on memory strength as
compared with face recognition studies, we nevertheless calculated mean effect sizes across 23 face recognition memory
studies and 30 eyewitness identification studies. In the former
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case, the mean r was .21, t(22) = 3.18, p < .005, 95% CI = .08–
.34; in the latter case, it was .16, t(29) = 3.58, p < .005, 95% CI
= .07–.25. However, the difference between these two correlations was not significant by a two-sample t test, t(51) = .21, p >
.05. Hence, nature of the research paradigm was not a moderator of average effect size.
Post hoc, it was suggested to us that a particularly strong
moderator of the effect size for delay might be the duration of
delay itself. In the third column of Table 1 (RI), we have included the length of delay between the shortest and longest
retention intervals for each study in our sample. Noting that
the most commonly encountered delay for British police has
been a month (Pike, Brace, & Kynan, 2002), we estimated the
average r to be .27, t(6) = 3.39, p < .01, 95% CI = .08–.44, for the
seven studies with delays of a month or more. For studies with
lesser durations of delay, we estimated the average r to be .17,
t(45) = 3.99, p < .005, 95% CI = .08–.25. The difference in magnitude of these two correlations suggests that duration of the
memory test delay itself might moderate effect size. This conjecture cannot be supported, however, because the difference
between effect sizes at shorter and longer durations of delay
was not significant, t(51) = .38, p > .05. Even so, it is interesting
to note that the upper bound of the confidence interval for the
studies with a maximum delay of a month or more was .44, as
compared with a comparable figure of .25 for studies with a
maximum delay of less than a month.
Thus, despite 22 of the sample of 53 effect sizes being null
or negative, we have found a statistically reliable effect size
estimate for the effect of retention interval on proportion of
correct recognition judgments, a measure of memory accuracy
for the human face. Furthermore, our effect size estimate does
not vary as a function of whether it is a product of studies
done in the face recognition memory paradigm or of studies
conducted in the eyewitness identification tradition. Hence, it
is reasonable to conclude that increased delay of a test for recognition memory for the once-seen face portends decreased
probability of correct recognition judgments. This decreased
probability presumably reflects loss of underlying memory
trace strength.
Our estimate of the effect size for retention interval on
memory for faces is also likely an underestimate of the actual value. The 28% of studies reporting forgetting effects
that were not statistically significant but for which no statistics were cited resulted in our entering a conservative value
of z = 0.00 in each instance. Most likely a small but positive
amount of forgetting was actually exhibited by participants
in such studies.
Our meta-analyses put us in a better position to specify
what happens over time to a person’s memory representation for an unfamiliar face. At least now we can say with
some assurance that memory strength will be weaker at longer retention intervals than at briefer ones. However, our
meta-analyses do not permit us to specify the shape of the
forgetting function and answers to related questions, such
as whether the memory representation will ever be truly
lost, much less when. To address these questions, we would
need to be able to specify a theoretical forgetting function
that would satisfactorily fit empirical forgetting functions,
particularly for studies in which facial recognition memory was tested at three or more retention intervals. The latter requirement would enable us to assess fit to nonlinear
functions.
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Finding a Theoretical Forgetting Function
for the Human Face
Criteria
As indicated earlier, the trier of fact has had no useful way
to estimate the initial strength of an eyewitness’s memory representation for the once-seen face. Clearly, for it to have forensic applicability, any candidate theoretical forgetting function must (a) be able to provide an estimate of initial memory
strength; (b) be accurate at predicting where future points will
fall as retention interval increases, a strong test of the theory
(Wixted & Carpenter, 2007); and (c) be able to satisfactorily fit
group forgetting data, the form in which empirical forgetting
functions exist in studies of memory for the human face included in our meta-analyses.
If a theoretical forgetting function is found that meets these
criteria, eyewitness memory researchers should finally have evidence bearing directly on their belief that the forgetting function for the once-seen face is Ebbinghausian in nature. That is,
93% of experts in the field of eyewitness testimony research,
when surveyed most recently (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon,
2001), agreed that there was a research basis for the notion
that the rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after an event and then levels off over time. A still large majority (83%) of these same experts agreed that this generalization
was reliable enough for psychologists to present in courtroom
testimony. There has been little direct evidence provided to
date, however, that the faith of these experts is justified when
it comes to specifying the forgetting function for the once-seen
human face. Consider the critique provided by Elliott (1993):
The Ebbinghaus forgetting curve … is another dubious metaphor for most eyewitness circumstances, both because the human face seems to have special properties as a
stimulus, and because the retention intervals that are pertinent to identification scarcely ever include the very short
ones where most forgetting presumably occurs. There is
now a large enough number of results that are null or negative with respect to the Ebbinghaus hypothesis that their
presence ought certainly to form part of any testimony
that might be given: They should no longer be treated simply as error. (p. 429)

Selection of a Theory of Forgetting
The only theory meeting the first criterion for forensic applicability, provision of an estimate of initial memory strength
at 0 s after stimulus cessation, is Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975,
1977, 1979) single-trace fragility theory of recognition memory.
Thus, Wickelgren’s theory is the only one that we evaluate for
its ability to meet the remaining two criteria. In its least complex version (Wickelgren, 1975, 1977), the form of the retention
function is m = Lt−De−It, where m represents memory strength
at a given retention interval, t seconds after target stimulus exposure has ended; L is initial memory strength at 0 s after stimulus exposure ends; D is the rate parameter for a time-decay
process, which is inversely proportional to the rate of memory consolidation; and I is the rate parameter for the loss of
memory strength due to interference, which is directly proportional to the similarity of the target stimulus to subsequently
encountered stimuli. Of course e = 2.72, the base of the natural
or Naperian system of logarithms. It is important to note that
Wickelgren (1974) proposed that at least for recognition mem-
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ory, an interval-scale measurement of memory strength (d′)
is possible by making relatively weak, yet plausible assumptions concerning how statistical decision theory would translate strength into yes–no decisions. For all practical purposes,
then, both m and L are measured in terms of d′ units.
Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory is unique
in that rather than distinguishing between short- and longterm traces, it posits a single memory trace and two mechanisms productive of forgetting. An interference-free, time-decay process produces rapid forgetting in the first seconds and
minutes of the retention interval because initially trace fragility is very high. As the neurophysiological process of consolidation begins to decrease trace fragility, however, the rate of
forgetting slows in a negatively accelerated fashion, and less
is forgotten per unit time. Consolidation, showing a negatively accelerated increase over time, is assumed to continue
to decrease trace fragility and its susceptibility to the time-decay process throughout the life of the memory trace. The negative power component of Wickelgren’s forgetting function,
t−D, would appear to be a plausible model of the negatively accelerated loss of trace fragility over time and therefore the continually decreasing amount of trace strength lost per unit time.
As the contribution of the time-decay process to forgetting
declines in power function fashion with increases in the retention interval, the second process, a storage interference process,
operating in a negative exponential fashion (e−It), would be expected to increase its influence on the rate of forgetting at longer retention intervals. This prediction might explain a result
noted by Deffenbacher, Carr, and Leu (1981), who found that
for recognition memory of both faces and words, the amount of
forgetting due to retroactive interference with an item’s trace in
storage increased over a 2-week retention interval.
We should note that a simpler version of Wickelgren’s
(1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory has been proposed (e.g.,
Wixted & Carpenter, 2007). This version, in effect, contains
only two free parameters, initial memory strength and the rate
of forgetting due to time decay. The version we have selected
(Wickelgren, 1974, 1975, 1977) contains a third parameter, rate
of forgetting due to interference generated subsequent to encoding of the stimulus. It would be prudent to justify the necessity of the additional free parameter.
We have found it necessary to retain the interference parameter to secure an adequate fit to empirical forgetting functions that included retention intervals greater than 1–2 weeks
in length. The two-parameter version provides about the same
degree of fit as the three-parameter one for retention intervals
up to this length. At longer intervals, however, face recognition
memory appears to require a source of forgetting in addition to
time decay. Values of the time-decay parameter sufficient for a
good fit at shorter intervals were not sufficient to account for
the considerable additional forgetting at longer intervals. Indeed, a plot of log memory strength (d′) against log time reveals a downward inflection in empirical forgetting functions
that occurs between an interval corresponding to about 1 week
and ones corresponding to a month or more (Deffenbacher,
1986). Interestingly, Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003)
found in their analysis of 314 lineups conducted by the London
Metropolitan Police that the probability of identifying the suspect decreased drastically in the interval between 1 week and
1 month, declining from .66 to .34. Finally, face recognition in
a forensic context often includes an institutional source of interference subsequent to encoding of the perpetrator’s face, the
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exposure of the witness to mugshots before a memory test by
means of a live or photographic lineup (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006). This sort of interference could be problematic if the later lineup were a target-absent one.
Previous Tests of the Theory
In the first decade after the introduction of the single-trace
fragility theory of forgetting in the 1970s, a modest amount of
empirical support was generated. For instance, Wickelgren
(1972, 1974, 1975) found that the theory provided an excellent
fit to forgetting functions obtained for episodic memory representations for frequently encountered words and for pictures
of commonly encountered objects. In the three publications
just cited, Wickelgren reported a dozen experiments resulting
in 35 separate r2 statistics, averaged across 3–10 research participants in each instance. The median r2 was .89, the proportion of empirical forgetting function variance accounted for by
single-trace fragility theory. All these experiments used yes–no
recognition memory tasks, with memory for verbal and pictorial materials being tested under a variety of conditions and
measured at retention intervals up to 2 years in length.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been only two
previously published attempts to fit any theory of forgetting
to face recognition memory forgetting functions. Deffenbacher
(1986) not only conducted a meta-analysis of memory for the
once-seen face as a function of retention interval but also conducted a preliminary test of the ability of Wickelgren’s (1972,
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) single-trace fragility (power-exponential) theory to fit empirical forgetting functions for face recog-
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nition memory. He found that Wickelgren’s power-exponential theory provided relatively good fits to the functions from
five different studies. Wixted and Ebbesen (1991, Experiment
2) showed that a simple power function was an excellent fit to
their empirical forgetting function for face recognition memory tested at retention intervals ranging from 1 hr to 2 weeks
in length.
Unfortunately, except for the single effort of Wixted and
Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 2), neither Deffenbacher nor anyone else ever followed up these first curve-fitting forays with
any further theory testing or development in regard to the forgetting of faces. Furthermore, neither Deffenbacher nor anyone
else ever made a serious attempt to determine to what extent
either Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory or any other theory of forgetting might have forensic application. In the next section, we attempt to remedy
the first of these two deficiencies. We remedy the second deficiency in a subsequent section.
New Tests of the Theory
Table 2 illustrates the results of our fitting Wickelgren’s
(1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to 11
empirical forgetting functions obtained from the face recognition memory and eyewitness identification literatures. These
11 data sets were obtained from studies that included at least
three retention intervals, that obtained a significant effect for
retention interval (positive forgetting), and for which sufficient
information was provided to calculate d′ values as a measure
of memory strength at each of the tested retention intervals.

Table 2. Fit of Single-Trace Fragility Theory to Empirical Forgetting Functions
Study
Barkowitz & Brigham (1982)

Observed and (predicted) d′ memory strength after various delays
0s
(1.70)

5 min
1.47 (1.47)

2 days
1.19 (1.24)

7 days
1.14 (1.18)

Chance & Goldstein (1987)
White faces
Japanese faces

0s

10 min

2 days

7 days

(2.49)
(1.53)

2.12 (2.12)
1.30 (1.30)

1.96 (1.82)
1.02 (1.02)

1.61 (1.72)
0.88 (0.76)

Courtois & Mueller (1981)

0s
(3.26)

1 min
2.94 (2.94)

2 days
2.41 (2.39)

28 days
1.93 (1.95)

Ellis & Flin (1990)
7 years/2-s encoding time
10 years/2-s encoding time
10 years/6-s encoding time

0s

5 min

1 day

7 days

(1.13)
(1.78)
(1.98)

0.98 (0.98)
1.54 (1.54)
1.72 (1.72)

0.74 (0.84)
0.98 (1.20)
1.72 (1.47)

0.70 (0.72)
0.72 (0.62)
1.23 (1.26)

Shepherd & Ellis (1973)

0s
(1.97)

3 min
1.73 (1.73)

6 days
1.24 (1.28)

35 days
0.78 (0.74)

Shepherd, Ellis, & Davies (1982)

0s
(2.78)

7 days
1.92 (1.92)

30 days
1.62 (1.64)

90 days
1.47 (1.17)

350 days
0.00 (0.29)

Wixted & Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 2)

0s
(2.47)

1 hr
2.01 (2.01)

1 day
1.75 (1.83)

1 week
1.46 (1.57)

2 weeks
1.41 (1.37)

Yarmey (1979)

0s
(3.39)

1 min
3.12 (3.12)

7 days
2.44 (2.30)

30 days
1.47 (1.50)
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Six of the data sets were obtained from studies published since
Deffenbacher’s (1986) preliminary test of Wickelgren’s theory
of forgetting.
We should note that these 11 functions were of necessity
fitted by eye so as to minimize the sum of absolute deviations of predicted and observed values. Least-squares or maximum likelihood estimates of parameter values were not possible, given that each forgetting function contained only three
or four retention intervals and that the observed values at each
retention interval were group d′ scores.
Fortunately, we were able to begin our curve-fitting exercise
by taking advantage of parameter values required to fit Wickelgren’s (1975) data for frequently encountered English words
and Ryback, Weinert, and Fozard′s (1970) data for recognition
of pictures of common everyday objects. We discovered, however, that the value of the time-decay parameter needed to fit
our data for unfamiliar faces was only one-tenth that required
for the data by Wickelgren (1975) and Ryback et al. (1970). The
same value of the time-decay parameter (.025) provided good
fits for 10 of the 11 forgetting curves. A value of .02 improved
the fit slightly for the remaining study (Yarmey, 1979). Values of the interference parameter that we used here were up
to an order of magnitude smaller (6 × 10−8) than that required
to fit the data of Wickelgren (1975) and Ryback et al. (1970), 6 ×
10−7. The forgetting data from Barkowitz and Brigham (1982),
Courtois and Mueller (1981), and Shepherd, Ellis, and Davies
(1982) and Chance and Goldstein’s (1987) data from Caucasians viewing Caucasian faces were fit with the 6 × 10−8 value
of the interference parameter, and the data from the remaining
seven studies were fit by values of the interference parameter
that were up to 16 times greater.
The values provided in the 0-s column of Table 2 are estimates of L, the initial memory strength parameter. Given that
all the data for memory measurement as a function of retention interval were group, rather than individual, in nature,
and given the lack of any previously established estimates of
initial memory strength for unfamiliar faces, we obtained initial strength estimates by substituting for the predicted value
of d′ in Wickelgren’s (1975, 1977) equation the observed value
of d′ obtained from the first retention interval at which face
memory was measured and then solving for L. It should therefore not be surprising that the predicted and observed values
match perfectly at the first retention interval for each forgetting function. Clearly, any statistical assessment of the adequacy of fit includes only the degree of fit at retention intervals
subsequent to the first. This approach also permits assessment
of how well the theory predicts where future points will fall as
retention interval increases beyond Time 0.
A statistical assessment of the fit of Wickelgren’s (1972,
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to the 11 empirical face forgetting functions was made by applying a chisquare goodness-of-fit test in each instance. In no instance was
the chi-square test significant. Hence, in each case the null hypothesis that both observed and predicted values represent
the same forgetting function could not be rejected. An omnibus chi-square test of the fit of retention interval data from all
11 functions (23 df) was also not significant. The quality of the
curve fits by the power-exponential theory is especially encouraging when one notes that the observed values of d′ are
by necessity group scores rather than being based on individually computed scores such as Wickelgren obtained from continuous recognition memory experiments.
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Thus, it can be said that Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975,
1977, 1979) power-exponential theory has met all three criteria
set out earlier for any theory of forgetting to have potential forensic applicability. The theory provides an estimate of initial
memory strength, predicts accurately where future points will
fall on the forgetting function as retention interval increases,
and satisfactorily fits functions based on group data. Before
considering the forensic applicability of Wickelgren’s (1975,
1977) theoretical forgetting function, however, we should first
note some additional aspects of its theoretical utility.
Further Theoretical Observations
Faces as a stimulus category. Finding a theory that fits face recognition memory forgetting functions has been rewarding in
terms of a number of additional insights gained, insights accrued beyond the mere promise of having a more precise accounting of the loss in fidelity for the memory representation
of the once-seen face. One particularly intriguing finding is that
not only is virtually the same value of the time-decay parameter required to fit the power-exponential theory to each of the
11 empirical forgetting functions but it is an order of magnitude
smaller than the value required by Wickelgren (1975) to fit forgetting functions for common English words and pictures of
common objects. Apparently, there is a more rapid rate of decline in trace fragility (a more rapid rate of increase in trace consolidation) for unfamiliar faces than there is for episodic traces
of familiar English words and pictures of familiar objects. Thus,
even though face recognition memory forgetting functions may
be fit by the same theory as forgetting functions for words and
objects, episodic memory for unfamiliar faces may decline more
slowly. As Deffenbacher (1986) noted, perhaps this phenomenon should not be all that surprising, given selection pressures
in the evolutionary history of our species to promote efficient
processing of faces. After all, faces constitute a very important
category of stimuli, providing a very rich source of socially relevant information, continually requiring all of us to make fine
discriminations among them, and needing a relatively large
quantity of human cortex to be devoted to their processing (e.g.,
Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992). Our finding that memory
representations for the unfamiliar face may be consolidated
more rapidly than for certain other visual stimulus classes reinforces the notion that faces may not be unique stimuli but they
are at least somewhat special (Ellis & Young, 1989).
Cross-race effect
A second interesting byproduct of our theoretical search is
revealed as a result of our fit of the power-exponential theory
to two forgetting functions provided by the data of Chance
and Goldstein (1987; see Table 2). Here we have additional illumination of mechanisms underlying the cross-race effect, a
forensically relevant phenomenon whereby once-seen faces of
another race or ethnic grouping are discriminated from one
another less well and later recognized less well than are onceseen faces of the observer’s own race (Meissner & Brigham,
2001). Chance and Goldstein’s observers were Caucasians exposed to Caucasian and Japanese faces, blocked in counterbalanced order by race of face. The statistically reliable crossrace effect obtained here was clearly due to superior encoding
of the Caucasian faces. This effect was documented by an initial memory strength superiority of approximately 1 d′ unit
for Caucasian faces when encoded by Caucasian observers
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as compared with the initial memory strength engendered by
their encoding of Japanese faces. It is also of interest that even
though Japanese faces were consolidated at the same rate as
Caucasian faces, requiring the same value of the time-decay
parameter for a fit of theory to forgetting function, the forgetting function for the Japanese faces required a value of the interference parameter 10 times as great,10−7 versus 10−8. This
finding provides support for the view that same-race faces are
more easily discriminated from one another than are otherrace faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001), providing an opportunity for them to be encoded in a more discriminating fashion, yielding thereby at least some of the encoding advantage
for same-race faces. Same-race faces would therefore likewise
be expected to withstand better the ravages of interference
generated by subsequent encounters with other faces during
any particular face’s retention interval. Indeed, Meissner and
Brigham (2001) found that cross-race effects were greater at
longer retention intervals.
Target face exposure. The effect of increases in target face exposure time is illuminated by our fit of Wickelgren’s (1972,
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory to two forgetting functions
yielded by the work of Ellis and Flin (1990). Examining the
face recognition memory functions generated by two different
groups of 10-year-old Scottish schoolchildren (Table 2), one
group having an encoding time of 2 s per face and the other
having encoding time of 6 s, we observed that the extra 4 s of
encoding time provided an initial memory strength advantage
of about 0.20 of a d′ unit. This initial advantage leveraged a
memory strength advantage of 0.50 of a d′ unit at a 7-day retention interval. A recent meta-analysis by Bornstein, Deffenbacher, McGorty, and Penrod (2007) has confirmed that longer exposures of target faces are associated with both higher
hit rates (r = .23) and lower false alarm rates (r = −.12). Clearly,
more research is needed in an effort to try to establish just how
much additional initial memory strength can be purchased by
n additional seconds of exposure time.
Age differences. Still another phenomenon of face recognition
memory is the age effect associated with efficiency of face processing, such that older children show superior memory for
faces. It would appear that the age effect associated with the
greater recognition memory shown by Ellis and Flin’s (1990)
10-year-olds with 2 s of encoding time per face as compared
with 7-year-olds with the same 2 s of encoding time is strictly
due to the former being able to encode unfamiliar faces more
effectively in the time available, yielding an initial memory
strength advantage of 0.65 of a d′ unit (Table 2). Up until the
middle teen years, face recognition memory shows continual
improvements in the ability to discriminate same-race faces
from one another and later to recognize them (Chance & Goldstein,1984). Thus, 10-year-olds have had another 3 years of fine
tuning of their brain’s perceptual learning “machinery,” permitting enhanced ability to respond to more subtle differences
among faces they typically encounter.
Failures to find retention interval effects
Finally, power-exponential theory can help us to understand at least one potential contributor to the frequent failure
to find statistically significant retention interval effects for face
recognition memory. Clearly, one factor in producing findings of a lack of a statistically reliable effect of forgetting occurs primarily when just two retention intervals are measured
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and both intervals are at points on the forgetting function between which little forgetting would be expected to occur. Although it is more informative to test retention at more than
two intervals, if only two intervals are to be tested, investigators should at least ensure that one occurs within minutes
after encoding, given the relatively rapid roll-off in memory
strength in the first minutes after encoding. After all, memory
strength for the once-seen face loses 15% of its strength in the
first 10 min of the retention interval. Consider an illustration
provided by the data from Wixted and Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 2, 11-s stimulus duration condition); see Table 2. Note
that there was about a 12% loss of original memory strength
(d′ = 2.47) between Day 1 and Day 7. However, the actual
amount of original memory strength lost since encoding was
about 41%. If one were to have only measured face recognition memory at the Day 1 and Day 7 intervals, one would have
underestimated the actual amount of forgetting by a factor of
more than three to one. Hence, Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975,
1977, 1979) power-exponential theory and its ability to provide an estimate of original memory strength permits us to see
clearly that just where retention intervals fall on the theoretical
forgetting function will affect the likelihood of finding statistically reliable amounts of forgetting.
Forensic Applicability of Power-Exponential Theory
As we indicated in the introduction to this article, to make
a proper assessment of the strength of an eyewitness’s current memory representation, a trier of fact needs to have an estimate of the witness’s initial memory strength, to know the
length of the retention interval, and to understand the nature
of the forgetting function for the once-seen human face. As retention interval length can usually be specified with some precision, acquiring an estimate of the eyewitness’s initial memory strength and a knowledge of the precise nature of the
forgetting function represent the key forensic needs.
Let’s consider the latter forensic need first. Psychologists are
now able to provide a much greater degree of specific knowledge to the trier of fact as regards the nature of the forgetting
function for human face recognition memory. It turns out that
we can now offer the judge or juror an estimate of what proportion of memory strength, regardless of its initial value, remained at the time the eyewitness’s memory for the perpetrator was tested. We can do this for three reasons. First, we
have clearly demonstrated the ability of Wickelgren’s (1972,
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to fit forgetting functions that have included retention intervals ranging
in length from 1 min to nearly 1 year. Second, we have demonstrated the remarkable constancy of the value of the timedecay parameter (.025) needed for a fit. Third, we have likewise demonstrated the relatively narrow range of values of the
interference parameter needed for a fit, practically all falling
within an order of magnitude of each other, 10−7 to 10−8. For a
conservative estimate of the proportion of remaining memory
strength, we can simply plug into Wickelgren’s (1975, 1977)
equation given earlier in this article the values of the forensically relevant retention interval (in seconds), the value of the
time-decay parameter at .025, and the value of the interference
parameter at 10−8; if a case involves a cross-race identification,
the interference parameter should be instead set at 10−7. For
a given retention interval, the resulting calculation yields the
estimated proportion of initial memory strength remaining.
Having an expert on eyewitness memory be able to testify to
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this estimate should aid the trier of fact considerably in his or
her task of assessing the fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory
representation. Knowing, for example, that at memory test, an
eyewitness had only 50% of original memory strength remaining would represent a real improvement in specificity over
what could be provided by an expert before the present. More
valid assessments of eyewitness credibility can only increase
the quality of justice rendered by a trier of fact.
Let’s now return to the other key forensic need for triers of
fact to be able to add precision to their assessment, the need for
an estimate of initial memory strength for the perpetrator’s face.
Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory of forgetting
is indeed unique among theories of forgetting in its specification
of an estimate of initial memory strength. However, the forensic
situation is neither a laboratory nor a field experiment and does
not yield an estimate of initial memory strength.
There is, nevertheless, a way to yield a conservative estimate
of initial memory strength for a typical eyewitness, conservative in the sense that the estimate would very likely represent
an upper bound on initial memory strength for many forensic
situations. The results of an interesting field experiment (Pigott,
Brigham, & Bothwell, 1990) provide us with the opportunity.
Pigott et al.’s (1990) participants were 47 Florida bank tellers,
each of whom interacted with one of two men who attempted
to cash a crudely altered U.S. Postal Service money order during a scripted 1.5-min encounter. More than 75% of these tellers
had training in eyewitness techniques but were not made aware
that their encounter with the perpetrator of attempted bank
fraud was not genuine until after their recall and recognition
had been measured 4 hr later. Averaged across two target-present and two target-absent lineups, their mean proportion correct was 0.55, which for a seven-alternative, forced-choice recognition memory task (six lineup members plus the alternative
of rejecting the entire lineup) is equivalent to a d′ score of 1.41
(Hacker & Ratcliff, 1979). It seems reasonable to account for the
alternative of rejecting the lineup as an additional choice. After
all, for a target-absent lineup, the correct choice is rejection of
the lineup. If this had not been done in the present instance, the
six-alternative, forced-choice d′ would have been 1.30.
If we substitute 1.41 for the value of m in Wickelgren’s
(1975, 1977) equation and solve for L, we come up with a very
plausible estimate of initial memory strength for the bank
teller eyewitnesses of Pigott et al. (1990), d′ = 1.79, equivalent to 67% correct on a seven-alternative, forced-choice task
(Hacker & Ratcliff, 1979). After 4 hr, then, memory strength
for the perpetrator of attempted bank fraud was just 79% of
what it had been originally. Had the tellers not been tested until a week after the encounter with the perpetrator, memory
strength would have been approximately d′ = 1.24, equivalent
to a predicted performance score of 49% correct—considerably
lower, although still better than chance.
The d′ value of 1.79 plausibly represents an upper limit for
initial memory strength for eyewitnesses in many forensic situations, at least for those not having a highly distinctive or
memorable perpetrator. That is, it is fair to say that the forensic scene for Pigott et al.’s (1990) bank tellers represents a close
to optimal situation for an eyewitness. Consider that the perpetrator was in full view for 1.5 min, an amount of target exposure greater than the “critical value” of 1.0 min noted by
Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) in their massive study
of lineups conducted by the London Metropolitan Police. The
banks were well illuminated. The perpetrators were not dis-
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guised. There was no alternative focus of attention present
that might ordinarily have been expected to draw the teller’s
attention away from the perpetrator’s face, such as a weapon;
only the face of the money order proffered by the man trying to perpetrate bank fraud required some attention. Tellers
should not have been operating under high stress levels, given
the absence of any personal threat to them.
To the extent that one or more of the optimal conditions of
the Pigott et al. (1990) study are not met in any given forensic situation, then, the predicted initial memory strength for an
eyewitness should be less than the figure of 67% correct predicted for the Florida bank tellers in Pigott et al.’s field experiment. Until further research is conducted—testing three or
more retention intervals and the effect of varying durations of
target person exposure, target person distinctiveness, and illumination levels, for instance—conservative advice to a trier
of fact would be that the typical eyewitness viewing a perpetrator’s face that was not highly distinctive would be expected
to have no more than a 50% chance of being correct in his or
her lineup identification (six-person lineup) at a 1-week delay. Clearly the trier of fact would still need to consider other
specific facts of the case to decide how much less than 50%,
if any, the chance of a correct identification might be in these
less than optimal witnessing conditions. Retention interval
benchmarks other than 1 week can be readily calculated, of
course, using Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory of forgetting and the data provided by Pigott et al. These
calculations do assume that the lineup’s construction and administration have been conducted fairly. However, a post hoc
assessment of lineup fairness is relatively straightforward
(Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, 2007).
To illustrate in particular the need for more research on the
relationship of variations in target face distinctiveness to initial memory strength, consider the results of using power-exponential theory to predict initial memory strength for the eyewitnesses in the field studies of Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley,
McFadzen, and Christenson (1990). Averaging across four different photo lineup conditions and 212 retail clerks, performance was at a level of 76% correct at a 48-hr retention interval,
equivalent to a d′ of 2.10. Using this value of memory strength
to estimate initial memory strength, we find a d′ value of 2.87
(91% correct), considerably higher than the 67% correct initial
memory strength figure predicted for Pigott et al.’s (1990) bank
tellers. Predicted performance level for Read et al.’s clerks would
have been 73% correct at a memory test delay of 1 week, equivalent to a memory strength value of d′ = 1.98. However, because
only one perpetrator was used across the four different 48-hr retention interval conditions to which Read et al.’s clerks were exposed, it may well be that their higher performance level than
that obtained by Pigott et al.’s (1990) eyewitnesses and those in
other field experiments was due to the single perpetrator having a rather distinctive, and hence memorable, face.
Conclusions
Psychological science is now in a position to offer the trier
of fact more than vague generalities regarding the relationship
between retention interval and strength of the memory representation for the once-seen face. The results of our meta-analysis confirm that there is indeed a statistically reliable association between longer retention intervals and decreased face
recognition memory, an association equally true of face recog-
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nition memory and eyewitness identification studies. That is,
there is an increase in positive forgetting as the delay increases
between encoding of a face and test of one’s memory for it.
The present meta-analytic review of the literature also provides support for Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979)
theory of forgetting from recognition memory, using data
from studies of memory for once-seen faces that used diverse
methodologies and a wide range of retention intervals. Fitting
Wickelgren’s power-exponential theory to 11 different empirical forgetting functions providing group data resulted in statistically satisfactory fits, fits predicting where future points
will fall on the function as retention interval increases. In addition, power-exponential theory provides an estimate of initial
memory strength. This latter feature of the theory, particularly
useful when applied to the results of field studies, permits calculation of not only an estimate of initial memory strength (d′)
but also calculation of a strength estimate at any given retention interval. Hence, not only can percentage of initial memory
strength remaining be determined at any retention interval,
but the strength estimate at a particular retention interval can
also be readily translated into a probability of being correct on
a fair lineup of a specified size. Of course, to be practically useful, these estimates would need to be calculated for and clearly
explained to the trier of fact by an eyewitness memory expert.
When considering the applicability of our findings, at
least two concerns might be raised. First, throughout this article, we have assumed that the amount forgotten is a function of the current strength of the memory representation. It
could be objected that what is remembered is also very much
determined by retrieval conditions, such as the type of memory test. Recognition memory tests are often more sensitive
measures of memory than are recall tests for the same material, for instance. Furthermore, the encoding specificity principle proposes that the amount of forgetting at retrieval is a
function of the degree of match between encoding context
and retrieval context. Although we do not deny the validity
of these objections, we do not see them as problematic for the
applicability of Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979)
theory to eyewitness memory. For one thing, the retrieval
tasks in the studies we have reviewed, eyewitness identification memory tests and laboratory face recognition tests, differ
somewhat but are still essentially tests of recognition memory. One of our moderator analyses showed that type of retrieval task, recognition memory or eyewitness identification,
was not a moderator of effect size for the correlation between
retention interval length and memory strength. In addition,
even though the match of encoding and retrieval context is
typically greater for recognition memory tasks than for eyewitness identification tasks, this difference did not affect the
strength of the relationship between retention interval and
memory strength, either. Furthermore, Wickelgren’s theory
was equally effective at predicting memory strength at any
given retention interval for both eyewitness identification
and face recognition memory studies.
A second concern that might be raised relates to the fact
that our curve-fitting exercise could only be applied to 11 forgetting functions from just eight published studies. The robustness of the data sets underlying these 11 functions clearly
depends on the overall quality of the eight published papers.
Our considered judgment is that there is little to be concerned
about in this regard. Quality of fit of theory and data shows no
obvious relationship to any perceived differences in quality of
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publication source or any minor differences in quality of methodology and data analysis.
In any event, psychologists interested in the psychology
of testimony now have much more abundant direct evidence
bearing on their belief that the forgetting function for the onceseen face is Ebbinghausian in nature (cf. Kassin et al., 2001):
Rate of memory loss for an unfamiliar face is greatest right after the encounter and then levels off over time. Psychological
science can now also provide to both these same psychologists
and triers of fact rather more specific details concerning the
decline and fall of a face’s memory representation over time
and succeeding facial encounters.
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